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Despite showing healthy macroeconomic gains in recent years, the economy is facing or is already in
a serious recession. While administration sources say that only minor adjustments are necessary to
correct imbalances, some private economists insist that the macroeconomic indicators do not tell the
whole story and that the government's economic model is largely to blame for the looming economic
crisis.
The current state of the economy has become a test of the administration's economic master plan,
"Economic Platform for Social Development," announced in February by President Armando
Calderon Sol (see NotiSur, 05/18/95). The plan has never been fully articulated nor has much of
it reached the legislature as an integrated set of proposals. This has given critics the opportunity
to accuse the administration of trying to manage the economy with incoherent and contradictory
policies. The main points in the Platform are tariff, monetary, and tax reforms, as well as efforts
to modernize the state with emphasis on the privatization of government-owned businesses. The
tariff on imported industrial inputs capital goods and raw materials is to be reduced from 5% to
1%, a move designed to build up the manufacturing sector and launch the country into the global
economy. A tax increase is to replace revenue lost from the reduced income from customs receipts.
These and other measures in the plan were supposed to generate the economic growth necessary
to drastically reduce poverty though job creation and massive government spending on social
programs.
However, nine months after it was announced, the economic plan appears to have faltered. What
has been put into law privatization, for example has been dogged with problems. Privatization of
the banking system raised charges that the sale of banks to the private sector enriched insiders. The
resulting decentralization of the banking system, say critics, surrendered too much control over
credit allocation to market forces, making rational use of capital resources difficult. Furthermore,
tariff reductions and monetary reforms had to be slowed because of resistance from the business
community, and proposals to sell off the electricity and telecommunications utilities led to serious
protest strikes from organized labor (see NotiSur, 09/21/91).
How the economy is performing under the plan is open to debate. Administration officials say there
are no serious problems and point to a third-quarter economic growth rate of 5.4% as compared
with 4.4% for the same period last year. The government is now predicting accumulated growth in
GDP of between 6% and 8% by the end of the year. Roberto Orellana president of the Banco Central
de Reserva de El Salvador (Central Bank) said in late October that corrective measures taken by
the bank would make any necessary adjustments in the economy. Starting in August, the Central
Bank moved aggressively to lower the inflation rate, which had already reached the government's
predicted maximum of 8% for the entire year.
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The government later projected a 10% accumulation by the end of 1995, but that too has already
been reached. Some private analysts say inflation could go as high as 15%.
To dampen inflation, the Central Bank began to sell certificates (Certificados de Estabilizacion
Monetaria) on the stock market to reduce the volume of money in circulation. The bank also
began raising interest rates to tighten credit. These measures, however, did not reduce inflation
in the following months. Accumulated inflation for the first nine months of the year reached 10%,
compared with an 8.8% accumulation from January-August. Worse, the shrinkage in available
credit hurt expansion of the agricultural and manufacturing sectors. The combined effects of the
Central Bank's anti-inflationary policies are to reduce consumer demand and dampen growth in the
productive sectors of the economy.
By October, it had become clear to some economists that the Central Bank corrections, along with
the three percentage point increase in the value-added tax (impuesto al valor agregado, IVA) from
10% to 13% in July, contributed to a slowing of the economy in the fourth quarter (for details on the
tax increase, see NotiSur, 08/10/95). Disposable income has been further constricted by governmentordered increases in electricity, public transportation, and other services. Industrial production
has dropped by up to 20% since July, and there has been a general slowing in construction and
the service sector. One explanation for the economy's unresponsiveness to corrective measures
is that the economic policies do not complement one another. Privatization and streamlining of
government activities, for example, require reductions in the size of the public-sector work force.
This is necessary to cut government spending and bring the fiscal deficit under control.
But without adequate growth in industry and agriculture, say independent economists, few of these
workers will find work in the private sector and will contribute to a further contraction of consumer
demand. Higher levels of unemployment will also place additional strain on budget allocations for
social programs. Moreover, the impressive growth in GDP predicted for this year now seems to be
a mixed blessing. The sectors with the greatest growth in recent years have not been the productive,
job-creating sectors of manufacturing and agriculture. According to a study by the Jesuit-run
Central American University (UCA), between 1988 and 1994 the highest growth rates were shown in
construction, trade, public utilities, and personal and other services.
Furthermore, the economy may be in far worse shape than GDP numbers suggest. If GDP growth
had been led by private investment, that might have meant a strengthening of the productive
base of the economy. But growth in private investment was barely one quarter of the growth in
consumption between 1990 and 1994. And, consumption has increasingly been fueled by inflows
of family remittances. Family remittances money sent home by Salvadorans working in the US are
expected to exceed US$1 billion this year and are the country's largest source of hard currency,
far outstripping export earnings. It is no wonder, then, that the administration has taken unusual
steps to insure that the flow of remittance dollars continues. Since January, the government has
been helping Salvadoran emigrants to stay in the US. It has opened counseling services through its
consulates in several US cities to give free advice to Salvadorans on how to apply for political asylum
in the US. "It could potentially compromise their case," said a legal services director in New York.
"How could someone apply at the consulate claiming persecution from the country they're fleeing
from? I think they were off their rockers when they did this." But in terms of the economy, the effort
©2011 The University of New Mexico,
Latin American & Iberian Institute
All rights reserved.

Page 2 of 3

LADB Article Id: 55873
ISSN: 1060-4189

to keep some 200,000 Salvadorans who are eligible to apply for political asylum from returning to El
Salvador may be the most crucial part of the government's economic master plan.
If the remittances were stripped out of the macroeconomic mix, it is clear that the economy would
be in serious trouble and that little if anything in the administration's present policies could make
up for the loss. A study by the UN's Economic Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean
(ECLAC) shows the importance of remittances to the stability of the economy. The study credits
remittance inflows with holding up an otherwise declining GDP during the 1980s. Remittances also
have been credited with providing the dollars to reduce the trade imbalance and with reducing
the number of people living in poverty by as much as 2.2% between 1991 and 1993. The obvious
necessity to balance off the weaknesses in the economy with voluntary contributions from abroad
which could be sharply cut by changes in US immigration policies suggests that the economy is in a
more precarious situation than growth indicators might show.
According to the UCA analysis, the impending economic crisis was not brought about by external
conditions alone, since mistaken government policies are also to blame. The problem, say critics,
is that the economic model itself, with its goal of creating an economy driven by exports, is not
working. The UCA study notes that the leading importer of capital goods was the transportation
sector with manufacturing far behind and agriculture in last place. The reality of the current
economic situation, says the study, "is that current development strategies are incapable of
overcoming the problems derived from the insufficient creation of productive jobs....The measures
contained in the economic development plan have been revealed, but it is not clear how they
expect to address the problem of 'tertiarization' [increasing dominance of the service sector] of
the economy and its dependence on external resources." [Sources: Inforpress Centroamericana
(Guatemala), 10/19/95; Proceso (El Salvador), 09/13/05, 10/25/95; New York Times, 10/27/95;
Associated Press, 10/26/95, 10/28/95, 10/30/95]
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